Robust Learning Experiments by Güth, Werner
Robust Learning Experiments
– Evidence for Learning and Deliberation –
Werner Güth∗
Abstract
Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally dif-
ferent decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeat-
edly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game),
forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected
by anticipation of rule changes. Adaptation to past success (the shadow
of the past) is revealed when playing the same game repeatedly. The ex-
periments of bidding behavior, reputation formation, endogenous timing in
negotiations, and alternating offer bargaining allow to draw a few general
conclusions.
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1. Introduction
The traditional assumption in economics is that decision makers are (perfectly)
rational and that, at least when game theory is involved, this is commonly known.
Thus decision alternatives are compared according to their present and future
consequences. The past only plays a role in so far as it determines the structural
aspects, e.g. via state variables like in dynamic programming or in dynamic games.
It is in this sense that rational decision making is purely forward looking.
Such forward looking deliberation requires well-behaved (intertemporal) prefer-
ences and unlimited cognitive abilities. But real decision makers meet neither of
these requirements: When having to decide often the first task is to become clear
of one’s primary goals. Secondary goals may suggest themselves when actually
predicting the consequences of certain decision alternatives. Although the human
brain is quite a sophisticated problem solver, we are at best boundedly rational:
Our capacity for processing and storing information and our analytic abilities are
seriously limited.
In spite of long research traditions in cognitive, social, and economic psychology
where such limitations were explicitly taken into account economists have usu-
ally relied on the rational choice approach. Evident doubts were subdued by as
if-arguments (only the rationally deciding firms will survive in competition), the
large variety of partly conflicting behavioral theories (by denying partly contra-
dicting specifications of preferences), or by the sometimes prevailing dominance
of macro-economics (where individual defects from rationality may be negligible).
The situation seems to have changed considerably: The (game) theoretic studies
in industrial organization capture the rich institutional structure of really exist-
ing markets which competitive market or traditional oligopoly models have largely
neglected. And in experimental economics (see Roth, 1995a, for a selective his-
torical survey) one designs laboratory experiments resembling such institutionally
rich market models to explore actual decision behavior.
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If experimental participants would be guided purely by monetary incentives, there
exists now sufficient evidence that rationality in decision making is rejected. Un-
like the former theoretical and empirical (often experimental) findings in psychol-
ogy this research (see, for instance, the Handbook of Experimental Economics,
Kagel and Roth (eds.), 1995) is considered as a serious challenge of the prevailing
rational choice approach. The reactions differ, however, in methodology.
One prominent reaction (see Bolton, 1991, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999, Geneakopolous, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1989, Rabin, 1993, for ex-
amples) is to defend the status quo, i.e. to maintain the rational choice approach.
Here experimental results are seen as questioning the adequate presentation of
the laboratory experiment, e.g. by claiming that experimental participants are
not only guided by monetary incentives alone but by other partly competing mo-
tivations. More generally: The rules, e.g. preferences, are “repaired” such that
optimal behavior is in line with experimental observations. Such attempts do not
question the exclusivity of forward looking deliberation but stress the imperfect
control (e.g. by monetary incentives) of what determines experimental behavior.
Of course, the additional motives are not completely ad hoc but are suggested by
naturally arising concerns.
A methodologically very different reaction is to substitute forward looking de-
liberation (“the shadow of the future”) by pure adaptation to past results (“the
shadow of the past”). Here the cognitive requirements are minor (in reinforce-
ment learning whatever was good in the past is seen as good, in genetic evolution
no cognition is needed). The possible adaptation dynamics depend, of course,
on the information feedback (reinforcement learning relies on past own success,
imitation, for instance, on comparing own and others’ success). In our view, such
denial of forward looking deliberation is empirically as false as perfect decision ra-
tionality: Human decision makers always try to cognitively perceive their decision
environment so that they can relate likely consequences to behavior. This is not
only true for mankind but also for the more developed species (e.g. mammals)
in the animal kingdom (see, for instance, de Waal, 1982, and Flack and de Waal,
2000).
Robust learning experiments provide evidence for both effects, namely for
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• boundedly rational forward looking deliberation to predict the likely conse-
quences of decision alternatives and
• adaptation to past experiences when feedback information is available.
This is done by confronting experimental participants with not just one but several
decision environments, e.g. with structurally different games, although the math-
ematical format of the decisions is the same. Thus forward looking deliberation
can be detected by anticipation of changing rules (of game) whereas adaptation to
past success is revealed when participants play the same game (rules) repeatedly.
In view of such evidence it should be clear that any reasonable behavioral decision
or game theory should be based on a cognitive representation of the decision
environment allowing for adaptation to past experiences in order to improve one’s
cognitive representation or to adopt a better decision alternative.
In the tradition of metastudies we review briefly robust learning experiments of
bidding behavior (section 2), repeated trust games (section 3), timing in bilat-
eral negotiations (section 4), and alternative offer bargaining (section 5). Finally
(section 6) we discuss the basic question how to combine forward looking deliber-
ation and adaptation to past success when modeling boundedly rational decision
behavior.
2. Auctions and Fair Division Games
Bidding behavior is a favourite topic in experimental economics (see for a selec-
tive survey Kagel, 1995). We will focus here on sealed bid—experiments in which
a single object is to be allocated and for which each potential buyer has an in-
dependent private value. Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel, Königstein, and Strobel (1999)
investigate four different allocation rules which we refer to as game types (see Ta-
ble II.1): First Price Auction (A1), Second Price Auction (A2), First Price Fair
Division Game (F1) and Second Price Fair Division Game (F2). Fair division
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games differ from auctions since the price at which the object is sold is equally
distributed among all bidders instead of being earned by an outside agent, the
seller. Allocating inheritance is a real life situation which resembles a fair division
game. The object is collectively owned by the heirs who, in many cases, are the




price = highest bid A1 F1
price = 2nd highest bid A2 F2
Table II.1: The four game types
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Table II.2: Bidding function, expected price and expected payoff for risk neutral
bidders
a) Design
Let vi be a bidder’s private value for the object to be sold, and suppose vi is drawn
for each player i = 1, ..., n independently from a uniform distribution on the unit
interval. For risk neutral bidders the equilibrium bid function b∗i (vi), expected
equilibrium price E(p∗) and expected equilibrium payoff E(π∗i (vi)) are listed in
Table II.2 (see Güth and van Damme, 1986).
1For an experimental study on a related topic see Franciosi, Isaac, Pingry, and Reynolds
(1993).
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In the experiment the private values ṽi did not vary continuously, but were drawn
from the set
Ṽ = {50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150}







(should) yield data in [0, 1]. Thus our theoretical benchmark in Table II.2 neglects
mainly discreteness.
Within a session each subject participated in 36 consecutive games of the four
different types. 9 subjects formed a session group. In each of the 36 periods they
were randomly partitioned into 3 groups of 3 bidders. The number of bidders
involved in each game (n = 3) was commonly known, but not their identity. All
subjects in all sessions played the same sequence of games. In periods t = 1 to 3
they played A1, in t = 4 to 6 then A2, from t = 7 to 9 the game type was F2 and
in t = 9 to 12 it was F1. This comprised the first block of 12 games. Then they
played block 2 (periods 13 to 24) and 3 (periods 25 to 36) in the same sequence
as block 1.
In each game participants had to submit a complete bidding strategy (bid vector)
bi(vi), i.e. a bid for each of the 11 values vi ∈ V. The actual value v0i was drawn
thereafter. Payments were determined according to the game rules and using the
submitted bidding strategies. Subjects were informed on screen about v0i, whether
or not they were buyer, about the price p at which the object was sold and about
their own payoff πi. Then the next round started.
Each game type applied 9 times. In the first of these 9 plays the bid screen
was blank and each subject had to enter a new vector of 11 bids (one for each
vi ∈ V ). In later periods the last bid vector for the same game type was displayed
as default. It could be revised or submitted as it is. Altogether we ran 6 sessions
and collected 1944 bidding strategies (54 subjects times 36 games).
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b) Results
If subjects learn something, their bid functions should approach some stable in-
dividual bid function. Each subject i played each type of game 9 times. For
every type we will refer to the bid function in the 9th play as i’s final bid func-
tion. Hence the final bid functions of game type A1, A2, F2, and F1 are bi,27(vi),
bi,30(vi), bi,33(vi), and bi,36(vi), respectively. To measure bid function adjustments
for game type A1 we calculated separately for each individual the Euclidean dis-
tance DA1i (t) ≡ kbit(vi)− bi,27(vi)k between i’s bid function bit(vi) in period t and
i’s final bid function where t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 13, 14, 15, 25, 26}, i.e. t is a period in which
game type A1 was played. Analogously we calculated DA2i (t), D
F2
i (t), and D
F1
i (t).
An adjustment process is monotone if Dji (t) with j ∈ {A1,A2,F2,F1} is decreas-
ing in t. A monotone adjustment process is called ‘convergent’ if Dji (t) decreases
more rapidly in earlier than in later periods, i.e. if Dji (t) is convex. Monotone
and (even more) converging processes will be interpreted as evidence for learning.
For classification of the observed processes we used slightly weaker criteria than
those described above in order to allow for some error. Specifically, we fitted
a piecewise—linear regression line to the data with Dji (t) as dependent and t as
independent variable, allowing for a kink of this line after 4 (out of the 8) periods.
Accordingly, a process is monotone if both slope coefficients are negative. If in
addition the coefficient is smaller in absolute value for later periods, the process
is convergent.
Table II.3 displays the relative frequencies of monotone, respectively convergent
adjustment processes. Between 61% and 74% one observes convergence; between
92% and 100% monotonicity. Although we do not know yet which behavior sub-
jects learn, we know that they do learn something.
Adjustment Process Game Type
A1 A2 F2 F1
Monotone 92% 95% 96% 100%
Monotone and Convergent 61% 69% 74% 70%
Monotone and Not Convergent 31% 26% 22% 30%
Not Monotone 8% 5% 4% 0%
Sum (mon. and non—mon.) 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table II.3: Classification of adjustment processes for different game types
While in each game each subject had to enter a complete bid function, only one
private value v0i was actually drawn. So only the bid submitted for this value
bi(v
0
i) was payoff relevant. Accordingly, the informational feedback received by
individual i after each game – i.e., i’s value v0i, the price p, whether or not i
bought the object and i’s profit –might suggest whether bi(v0i) should be adjusted
in future periods. But it does not tell anything regarding bids bi(v00i ) for all values
v00i 6= v0i. A naturally arising question is therefore whether bid functions were



































Figure II.1: Frequency distributions for the number of bid function changes for
the different game types.
Figure II.1 shows frequency distributions for the number of bid function changes
for the different game types. If the number of changes is 11, a bid vector is
changed in each component. We observe that if a bid function is changed at all2,
2A single subject plays each game type 9 times. So, it can change its bid function for each
game in at most 8 periods (change periods). The maximal number of change periods per subject
is therefore 32 and the maximal number of change periods per game type is 432 (54 subjects
times 8). The percentages of change periods (observed change periods divided by maximal
change periods times 100) are 54% in A1, 48% in A2, 34% in F2 and 33% in F1.
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it is simultaneously changed at all values in most cases. Thus bid functions are


















Figure II.2: Average decision time by periods 1 to 36
While the game rules differed between the 4 game types, the format of subjects’
decisions were the same. Figure II.2 shows that decision time is first high and
then decreases. If subjects followed a non—cognitive learning approach, we do
not see why decisions should take less time in the end than in the middle of the
sequence. Furthermore, Figure II.2 shows that decision time ‘jumps up’ whenever
the game type changes; i.e. at periods 1, 4, 7, 10, ...34. Within the first block
(periods 1, 4, 7, and 10) this is natural, since all subjects had to type in a new
bid vector; in later periods, however, they could rely on their former strategy for
the same game type and just click the OK—button. But, the displayed path also
shows spikes in periods 13, 16, ..., 34 were the above explanation does not hold. If
one takes the time span subjects need to come up with a decision as an indicator
of their cognitive effort, this structure is quite plausible.
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3. Reputation formation
The trust game is a simple sequential game whose two players 1 and 2 can prof-
itably cooperate if they trust each other. As illustrated by Figure III.1, first player
1 chooses between N(on—cooperation) or T (rust in reciprocity). In case of N the
game is over and both players receive s. In the case of T now player 2 decides
between E(xploiting) and R(ewarding). Whereas R yields r for both players, only
player 2 receives t and player 1 nothing in case of E. Due to t > r an opportunistic
player 2 would exploit what, in turn, renders N for player 1 as optimal although



















































Figure III.1: The trust game with t > r > s > 0
One naturally would expect that at least some people feel obliged to reward a
trusting player 1. If such rewarding behavior by player 2 cannot be excluded,
reputation equilibria (see Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson, 1982) predict
that even an opportunistic player 2 will at least initially mimic such a rewarding
player 2 when the trust game is played repeatedly by the same partners. By
imitating an always rewarding player 2 such an opportunistic player 2 strategically
manipulates the reputation (the conditional probability) of being of the always
rewarding type. This may induce player 1 to continue initial cooperation in the
course of the finitely repeated trust game.
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a) Design
The main treatment of Anderhub, Engelmann, and Güth (1999) explicitly intro-
duces the possibility of a (second mover) type who always feels obliged to reward
trust. Trust is automatically rewarded with probability p whereas with compli-
mentary probability 1 − p player 2 is free to choose. Actually when trust was
automatically rewarded, it meant that one did not encounter a human player 2
but a robot strategy. The instructions did not explicitly mention that the au-
tomatically rewarding player 2 is a robot (without indicating the presence of a
real partner either). We conducted a control treatment with no automatically
rewarding type of player 2, i.e. p = 0. Apart from this modification the design
was the same. Participants choose mixed strategies to test the qualitative and
quantitative predictions of reputation equilibria also on the individual level (and
not just for the entire population).











in the main treatment
0 in the control treatment.
Robust learning concerns the number m of successive periods for playing the trust
game by the same two partners. Let yt (xt) denote the probability of reward R
(trust T ) in period t of the repeated game. The m periods of the basic trust game
define one (repeated) game. Each participant played successively several repeated
trust games with changing partners where the numbers of repetitions were
m = 3, 6, 2, 10, 3 and 6.
To inspire learning a participant constantly assumed the role of player 1 or player
2. In each new repeated game of the main treatment it was again randomly
decided whether or not a particular player 1 was matched with a real player 2 or
not. A participant had to specify the probabilities in percent for his two decision
alternatives.
The unique reputation equilibria depend on m as follows:
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Independent of m in the range m ≥ 3 the mixing phase of both players extends
over two periods, namely the last two periods for player 1 and the third and second
to last period for player 2.
To exclude unwarranted repeated game effects resulting from playing repeatedly
(repeated) games a participant confronted a new partner in each (repeated) game.
Also indirect reputation effects were prevented by the matching procedure. More
specifically, for each session 9 players 1 and 6 players 2 were invited and were
matched accordingly. The 5 sessions of the main treatment thus provide data
of altogether 45 players 1 and 30 players 2. Each of the p = 0 sessions of the
control—treatment involved 6 players 1 and 6 players 2. Since the behavior of
two participants cannot be regarded as independent, only the 5 sessions in the
main treatment and the 3 sessions in the control treatment qualify as independent
observations.
b) Results
Let xt(i) and yt(i) denote participant i’s probability of trust (T ), respectively of








where N1 = 45 and N2 = 30 are the numbers of participants playing the role of
player 1 or player 2, respectively. How xt and yt develop over time is illustrated
by Figure III.2. Here only the xt—choices of the players 1 confronted with real
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players 2 are considered. Since participants play successively repeated games
with m = 3, 6, 2, 10, 3, and 6 periods, they play altogether 30 periods. A vertical
dashed line in Figure III.2 indicates the last period of a (repeated) game. The end
or termination effect (xt drops when the last period of the game is near) is minor
only for the first two games. Afterwards there is always a sharp decline of xt. A
reason for this is suggested by the development of yt. From the end of the second
game on (period 9) players 2 on average reward only rarely in the last period of
a (repeated) game.
Figure III.2: Average trust- and reward-probabilities per period
How did players 1 react to being exploited? 10 of the 45 players 1 were never
exploited before the last period of a game. 10 of the remaining 35 players 1 never
trusted again in the same game after being exploited, whereas 25 did. These 25
clearly violate a basic requirement of reputation equilibria.
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Figure III.3: Average trust (top) and reward (bottom) rates for games with 3
(left) and 6 (right) periods
To check for experience effects one can compare the 1st and the 5th as well as the
2nd and the 6th repeated game extending over 3 and 6 periods, respectively. In
Figure III.3 (left) we have confronted the xt—development of the 1st game (solid
squares) with the one of the 5th game (hollow squares) in the upper part and
the yt—development in the lower part. The analogous comparison of the 2nd and
6th game can be found in Figure III.3 (right). While average trust— and reward
rates hardly ever increase in the 5th and 6th game, this is not the case for the
inexperienced participants in the 1st and 2nd game. For m = 6 the learning effects
(players 1 learn to trust less and players 2 to exploit when the end is near) shift
behavior into the direction of rational behavior. Average trust is initially nearly
constant (xt ∼ .8 for t = 1, 2, 3, 4) before it drops to x6 ∼ .4. Similarly there is a
sharp decline from yt ∼ .9 for t = 1, 2, 3, 4 to y6 < .2.
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games games 1 and 5 games 2 and 6
player period 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Z —2.750 —0.679 —1.391 —2.301 —2.159 —2.837 —1.426 —1.314 —2.626
sign. p .006∗ .497 .164 .021∗ .031∗ .005∗ .154 .189 .009∗
2 Z —3.158 —2.432 —1.862 —2.812 —1.869 —1.051 —0.406 —1.647 —2.014
sign. p .002∗ .015∗ .063 .005∗ .062 .293 .684 .100 .044∗
Table III.1: Wilcoxon—test for single periods in games of equal length
Table III.1 gives the results of a Wilcoxon—test comparing for each individual the
decisions in corresponding periods in different games of equal length. The learning
from earlier to later games towards the normative benchmark is significant (5%—
level) for the first period and both types of players, i.e. trust and reward increase
significantly from game 1 to game 5 and from game 2 to game 6. For the last
period of the 6 period games the opposite effect is significant for both types of
players.
4. Endogeneous timing in bilateral negotiations
Endogenous timing allows to reduce the wide variety of (bargaining or, more
generally, decision) processes and thus to predict more precisely what will hap-
pen. Parties do not only negotiate but also determine the process of bargaining
(for endogenous timing see, for instance, Spencer and Brandner, 1992, Sadanand
and Sadanand, 1996, and van Damme and Hurkens, 1999; for our experimental
situation Güth and Ritzberger, 2000).
a) Design
In the experiment (Güth, Marchand, Rulliere, Zeiliger, 2000) two parties, players
1 and 2, can share a randomly determined pie p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The distribution
governing the random choice of the available monetary reward p is
F (p) = pa with a > 0.
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The positive parameter a is the only treatment variable. If a is low, the expected
pie is low; if a is large, also the expected pie is large. Both players i = 1, 2 have
two choices, namely to decide early (the choice Ei), i.e. before p is randomly
selected, or to wait (the choice Wi) till after p is chosen and commonly known.
After both players i = 1, 2 have simultaneously decided for Ei or Wi, the chosen
constellation is announced, i.e. when actually negotiating both timing dispositions
are commonly known.
How then do players bargain knowing the timing dispositions? In case of (E1, E2)
both players i = 1, 2 state their demand di with 0 ≤ di ≤ 1 before p is randomly
chosen. For (W1,W2) the order is reversed: First p is randomly chosen and publicly
announced, then both players i = 1, 2 choose their demands di with 0 ≤ di ≤ 1. If
i has chosen Ei and j (6= i) the timing Wj, first i chooses di before p is randomly
chosen; knowing di as well as p then j finally determines his demand dj.
Regardless of the timing dispositions the monetary payoffs depend on d1, d2, and
p as follows: If d1 + d2 > p, both players receive nothing; otherwise each player i
gets his demand di, i.e. a positive residual p− d1 − d2 is lost for the two parties.
The experiment distinguishes three parameters a, a = 3 yielding (E1, E2), a =
.5 with (W1,W2), and a = 1.2 where both, (E1,W2) and (W1, E2), are strict
equilibria (of the early decision stage) according to the normative benchmark
solution assuming commonly known risk neutrality (see the more general result
of Güth and Ritzberger, 2000). Participants played repeatedly each of the three
treatments with randomly changing partners. Random matching was restricted
to groups of eight participants. To limit repeated game effects we invited always
16 participants into the laboratory without telling them how rematching was
restricted. More specifically, participants played 4 rounds of a = 3−games, then
4 rounds of a = 1.2−games, and finally 4 rounds of a = .5−games. These 12
successive rounds establish one cycle which was repeated 3 times. Thus each




Let us first describe how bargaining outcomes, i.e. demands and payoffs, depend
on the timing of decisions, i.e. EE (both early), EW (one early, one late), orWW
(both late), and on experience where we compare the first 24 rounds with the later
ones. In the following “D” stands for absolute and d for relative demands. The
‘relative demands’ “d” = dE in Table IV.1 for (E,E) and the 1rst component in
case of (E,W ) measure what a party demands in proportion to the ‘expected pie’
P which, of course, depends on the parameter a . For E,W the proportion of
accepted d = dE−offers by W−partners, denoted by A, is reported. In case of
W,W the relative demand d is the actual share d = D/p of the actually available
pie. Further σ2 = σ2E denotes the variance of dE and c the conflict ratio for the
altogether n plays.
rounds 1-24 rounds 25-48 Theoretical
relative demands relative demands predictions
d σ2 c n d σ2 c n D∗E d
∗ c∗
a = 3 .533 .019 .60 40 .542 .022 .74 39 .37 .49 .41
E,E a = 1.2 .529 .032 .77 13 .467 .018 .77 13 .34 .62 .63
a = .5 .955 .344 1 7 .464 .203 .88 8 .32 .96 .80
a = 3 .500 .004 .07 72 .500 .003 .04 72 p/2 .5 0
W,W a = 1.2 .684 1.216 .14 106 .483 .005 .06 110 p/2 .5 0
a = .5 .492 .011 .08 118 .496 .006 .13 126 p/2 .5 0
dE ; A σ
2
E c n dE ; A σ
2






a = 3 .70;.94 .059 .30 76 .70;.78 .020 .59 81 .63 .84 .25
E,W a = 1.2 .72;.86 .083 .59 73 .62 ;.86 .037 .65 69 .52 .95 .46
a = .5 .77;1 .282 .73 67 .56 ;.95 .290 .67 58 .44 1.33 .66
Table IV. 1: Average behavior
For all levels of parameter a the order of the conflict ratio c is
c(E,E) > c(E,W ) > c(W,W )
and for all timing constellations (t1, t2) = (E,E), (W,W ), (E,W ) one has:
c(a = .5) > c(a = 3) for rounds 1-24
and c(a = .5) > c(a = 1.2) > c(a = 3)for rounds 25-48.
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How does a party react to being the (only) preemptor and how does this de-
pend on the treatment variable a and on experience? To test this statistically
the distribution of relative demands dE for (E,E) is compared with the dE dis-
tribution for (E,W ) separately for each level a and early (rounds 1-24) and late
(rounds 25-48) plays (see Table.IV. 2). Similar to the theoretical prediction the
E−partners demand significantly more in case of a = 3 and a = 1.2 when they
are the only preemptor in their group. There are two reasons for conflict in
the EW−constellations, namely rejection by the W−partner and conflict due to
dE > p. The majority of conflicts is caused by excessive demands (dE > p).
Rejections by W−partners are rare and irregular.
Kolmogorov Smirnov Test rounds 1-24 rounds 25-48
a = 3 p < .001 p < .001
a = 1.2 p < .001 p < .01
a = .5 p = ns p = ns
Table IV.2 : Comparisons of the dE-distributions for (E,E) and (E,W ).
To illustrate the dynamics of timing decisions Figure IV.1 displays the relative
frequency qW of waiting (theW−choice) for all 48 successive rounds. The vertical
dotted lines indicate a change of the treatment variable a where the order is always
first a = 3, then a = 1.2, and finally a = .5. Figure IV.1 reveals that the major
changes of qW are caused by a−changes, especially when switching from a = 3 to
a = .5.
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Figure IV.1: W -share in periods t
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Figure IV.2: ∆qw(t) in periods t
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Figure IV.2 illustrates the qW−development by its deviation from the predicted
timing disposition, i.e. ∆qW (t) = qobsW (a) − q∗W (a) where we set q∗W (a) = .5 for
a = 1.2. There are large deviations from the theoretical predictions, especially
when a = 3 and a = 1.2. In case of the a = 3−situation 58% of the participants’
follow a kind of ‘wait and see’−strategy, i.e. they prefer flexibility over preemption
in spite of the solution (E,E).
How much of the qW changes are due to a−changes is tested via a linear regression
qW = α+ αI(a=.5) + αI(a=3) + β.t
with treatment dummies where I(.) denotes the indicator function (assuming the
value 1 for a = .5, respectively a = 3, and 0 otherwise) and with a = 1.2 as the
base line. The result
qW = .75+ .049I(a=.5)− .174I(a=3)+ .0001 t , R2 = .701
t = 31.338 t = 2.09 t = 7.395 t = .019
p < .0001 p < .05 p < .0001 p = .828
reveals significant treatment dummies whereas the time coefficient β is insignif-
icant (separate regressions qW = αa + β
a · t for a = .5, 1.2, and 3 also yield
insignificant time coefficients βa).
How the payoff difference in E,W−groups feeds back on the timing disposition
can be assessed by Figure IV.3 (for changes from W to E). The thin curves
represent the average difference in earnings between the E− and the W−partner
in period t − 1 and the bold curves the proportion of participants who were the
W−partner in (E,W )-pairs in period t − 1 and decided to switch to E in t.
According to Figure IV.3 most of the switches are driven by earning differentials
(the two curves are rather parallel) whereas most (86%) of the changes from E to
W cannot be explained by earning differentials.
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change from W to E in round E minus W-earnings in previous round
Figure IV.3: Changing from W to E after being in an E,W−pair
5. Alternating offer bargaining
Alternating offer bargaining is a familiar topic in experimental economics. Start-
ing with Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985) it has been debated whether and
how actual bargaining behavior differs from game theoretic predictions (see Güth,
1995, and Roth, 1995b, for surveys).
a) Design
Let T = 3 denote the maximal number of bargaining rounds. Over time the “pie”
pt can either decrease or increase. Whereas a shrinking pie reflects the well-known
costs of delaying an agreement like waste of time, starting too late cooperating
etc., an increasing pie can be justified by the fact that later agreements are often
more adequate, e.g. by being based on more information, superior incentives etc.
Anderhub, Güth, and Marchand (2000) do not only rely on the two monotonic
developments, but also allow for a “hill” (the “pie” is largest in round t = 2) and
a “valley” (the “pie” is lowest in round t = 2). There is one vector (p1, p2, p3) of
pies pt in periods t = 1, 2, 3 for each of these four different “pie”-developments
(see Table V.1).
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Each of the four cases (p1, p2, p3) is played first twice with and then twice without
ultimatum power (an offer can be declared to be final or not, see Güth, Ockenfels,
and Wendel, 1993). Thus participants first learn to play a usual alternating offer
game before commanding ultimatum power. We refer to the altogether 16 games
(4 vectors (p1, p2, p3) × 4 successive plays) as a cycle. Participants play 3 such
cycles, i.e. altogether 48 bargaining games.
Players 1 and 2 alternate in proposing an agreement which the other party can
then accept or reject. Acceptance always ends the game with the proposed payoff
distribution, a vector (u1, u2) with pt ≥ u1, u2 ≥ 0 and u1 + u2 = pt where the
pie pt is what can be distributed in round t = 1, 2, 3. If t < T and the offer
pt − dt to the other party (dt is what the proposer demands for himself) is not
an ultimatum, rejection leads to round t+ 1 where now pt+1 can be allocated by
the rejecting party. If t = T or if, for t < T , the offer pt − dt is an ultimatum,
bargaining ends in conflict with each party receiving 0-payoff. In round
t = 1: player 1 chooses d1, i.e. 1 proposes, 2 responds,
t = 2: player 2 chooses d2, i.e. 2 proposes, 1 responds,
t = 3: player 1 chooses d3, i.e. 1 proposes, 2 responds.
p1 p2 p3 nickname symbol
30 20 10 decline D
10 20 30 increase I
10 25 10 hill H
25 10 25 valley V
Table V.1: The four “pie”-developments
Each of the four developmentsD, I, H and V can be played with proposers having
ultimatum power, the games Dy, Iy, Hy, and V y, or not, the games Dn, In, Hn,
and V n. For each of the 4 developments D, I, H, and V the left column of Table








and u∗2 for player 1 and 2. If ultimatum power is available, it will always be used,
i.e. each proposal d∗t for t = 1, 2, 3 and the games D
y, Iy, Hy, and V y is an
ultimatum. Thus with ultimatum power bargaining always stops in round t = 1
whereas this is true only for D if no ultimatum power is available. The round t∗
in which the agreement is reached is indicated in Table V.2 by fat demands d∗t .
ultimatum power




















D = (30, 20, 10) 19 10 9 19 11 29 19 9 29 1
I = (10, 20, 30) 10 20 29 29 1 9 19 29 9 1
H = (10, 25, 10) 10 15 9 10 15 9 24 9 9 1
V = (25, 10, 25) 24 10 24 24 1 24 9 24 24 1








2 for the 8 different
games Dy, Iy, Hy, V y, respectively Dn, In, Hn, V n
The benchmark solution assumes that only integer offers are possible and that in
case of indifference a responder always rejects. Whereas in the n-games Dn, In,
Hn, and V n the outcome is always efficient in the sense that u∗1 and u
∗
2 add up to
the maximal “pie”, this is only true for the y-games Dy and V y when p1 is largest.
The computerized experiment involved 6 sessions with 12 participants each.
b) Results
One coarse way of searching for experience effects is to compare the average earn-
ings of both players for the 3 cycles (see Table V.3 which distinguishes by role,
1 or 2, by cycle (1st, 2nd, 3rd), game type (D, I, H, V , all games) and n(o) or
y(es)-ultimatum power). According to Table V.3 earnings are surprisingly con-
stant over the three cycles when proposers command no ultimatum power. With
ultimatum power average earnings increase significantly from the 1st to later cy-
cles. It seems that the additional complexity due to ultimatum power of proposers
(y) requires “learning to reach efficient agreements”.
Average earnings are affected by
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• the conflict rate
• the round of reaching an agreement
• the payoff distribution which is accepted.
The first aspect is illuminated by Table V.4 listing the agreement, respectively
conflict ratios as well as their absolute numbers (in the 3 cycles) for the 3 bargain-
ing rounds separately for the n(o) and the y(es)-games. Most agreements occurred
when the periodic pie is largest where, of course, in case of “V (alley)” this applies
to the 1st and 3rd round. Notice that game theory excludes conflict and predicts
agreement for rounds with largest periodic pie in case of no ultimatum power,
respectively for the 1st round in case of ultimatum power (see Table V.2). The
agreement ratios in Table V.4 thus imply that agreements are mostly achieved
when the pie is largest, what partly (in case of no ultimatum power) confirms
game theory and partly (with ultimatum power) rejects it.
The hypothesis that participants are simply efficiency-minded is questioned by the
non-neglible numbers of conflict 28 for D, 40 for I, 34 for H, and 45 for V when
proposer have ultimatum power (for no ultimatum power the relative frequencies
of conflict are .56 for D, .07 for I, .44 for H, and .25 for V ). Only for game types
Dy and V y, when the 1st pie is largest, conflict occurs most frequently in the 1st
round. There is no clear evidence that learning (measured by cycle) reduces the
frequency of conflict.
Since efficiency depends only weakly on the level of experience, Table V.5 provides
a fair impression of the overall efficiency
δ =
u1 + u2
max {p1, p2, p3}
for all eight game types. Only for the pie-dynamics I ultimatum power of pro-
posers reduces efficiency. But none of differences is significant. Also the differences





listed in Table V.5, the proposer, when the pie is largest, is always slightly favored.
Altogether average payoff distributions are very fair (in the sense of .45 ≤ s ≤ .55).
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Mean
,47 ,44 ,49 ,43 ,40 ,45 ,45 ,42 ,47
,41 ,49 ,49 ,35 ,41 ,42 ,38 ,45 ,45
,45 ,49 ,49 ,41 ,43 ,43 ,43 ,46 ,46
,33 ,45 ,43 ,29 ,38 ,37 ,31 ,41 ,40
,42 ,41 ,41 ,50 ,49 ,50 ,46 ,45 ,46
,34 ,35 ,36 ,41 ,47 ,46 ,38 ,41 ,41
,47 ,48 ,48 ,40 ,40 ,41 ,44 ,44 ,44
,42 ,40 ,48 ,34 ,33 ,39 ,38 ,36 ,44
,45 ,45 ,47 ,43 ,43 ,45 ,44 ,44 ,46
















1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Role 1 Role 2 Both Roles
Table V.3: Average earnings as percentages of max{p1, p2, p3} separated by




1 2 3 (agree. / conf.) 1 2 3 1 2 3
D .80 .63 .44 .56 .82 .91 - .13 .09 -
(54,53,60) (11 ,8,8) (4,2,1) (1 ,7,1) (48 ,61 ,63) (7,2,1) (0 ,0 ,0) (15 ,6 ,6) (0,1 ,0) (0,0,0)
I .03 .06 .93 .07 .05 .08 .92 .01 .12 .08
(4,1 ,1) (7,4,1) (54,61 ,63) (5,4,5) (5,6,0) (6,3,6) (38,54 ,52) (3 ,0 ,0) (10,5,9) (8,2,3)
H .04 .91 .56 .44 .06 .84 .50 .01 .15 .50
(2,2,4) (62,61 ,61 ) (4,3,3) (2,4,2) (6,4,2) (50,56,57) (1 ,0 ,0) (1 ,1 ,1) (12,9,9) (0,0,1)
V .50 - .75 .25 .68 - .65 .22 .09 .35
(38,34,32) (0,0,0) (23,27 ,30) (9,9,8) (49 ,45,49) (0,0,0) (4,6,12) (11 ,15,7) (1 ,2,0) (5,2,2)
Table V.4: Conditional probability of reaching an agreement or conflict in round
t (total numbers of 1rst, 2nd, 3rd cycle in brackets).
N(o) Y (es)






Table V.5: Efficiency and relative payoff distribution δ and s
6. Discussion
Each of the experimental studies investigates already a broader spectrum of games
than just one specific game:
• In section 2 bidding behavior is not only explored for the two most prominent
price rules but also for auctions and fair division tasks.
• Section 3 captures different strategic situations by studying different finite
numbers of repeating the basic trust game.
• Different random moves, determining how large the (expected) pie is, are
examined in section 4 whereas
• section 5 considers not only structurally different (deterministic) pie devel-
opments but also proposers with and without ultimatum power.
As such each individual study allows already some conclusions how participants
anticipate rule changes, i.e. evidence for the shadow of the future, and how they
respond to their earlier experiences and thus how relevant the shadow of the past
is. The two influences on behavior, based on the situations studied in section 2,
are illustrated by Figure VI.1: It shows for each of the 11 possible true values
how bids are adjusted. Initially bids are often adjusted even when confronting
the same game type repeatedly but later on major adjustments occur only when
facing a new game. Evidently learning slows down rather soon (see the evidence
for “convergence” in Table II.3) whereas anticipation of new rules persists and
becomes even stronger with experience. For the other studies a comprehensive
illustration like in Figure VI.1 is less obvious.
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Figure VI.1: Adjusting bids to experience (shadow of the past) and anticipation
of new rules (shadow of the future)
All four studies support the major claim that human decision behavior is influ-
enced by both, the shadow of the past, i.e. by experiences, as well as by the
shadow of the future in the form of forward looking deliberation: For section 2
this is illustrated by Figure VI.1. The claim is, however, also supported
• in section 3 by the more reasonable behavior when playing the same game
again as well as by the systematic end effects,
• in section 4 by reacting to the differential payoffs in mixed pairs as well as
by the different timing decisions for a large, medium, or small expected pie,
and
• in section 5 where participants pay attention to ultimatum power and focus
on the largest pie.
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For the theory of boundedly rational decision making this means that one has to
combine ideas
• how decision makers cognitively perceive their decision environment and
update their cognitive model in the light of new information and
• how previous own and others’ success (provided that such information feed-
back is available) will lead to behavioral adaptation.
Any comprehensive concept of bounded rationality has to rely on both aspects.
Thus no simple learning or evolutionary dynamics will do. Similarly, no rational
choice-approach which does not pay attention to the limited cognitive abilities of
human decision makers meets both requirements. As the most developed species
in the animal kingdom humans still rely on animal-like learning like reinforcement
dynamics but also continuously try to develop causal models (of the world) al-
lowing to predict the likely consequences of alternative ways of behavior. Simple
concepts of bounded rationality like satisfying (Simon, 1976, and Selten, 1998) do
not yet meet such requirements. One would have to specify how aspirations are
formed in the light of past experiences as well as of forward looking deliberations.
This requires ideas like a “behavioral repertoire”, e.g. in the form of managerial
experiences and skills for qualitatively and quantitatively different decision envi-
ronments, and a “hierarchy of decision considerations” progressing from simple
(for less relevant decisions) to more demanding (for important decisions) types
of deliberation (early and preliminary approaches are Güth, 2000, and Neisser,
1987).
What else can be learned by comparing the results of the different studies reviewed
here? In highly complex situations like in sections 2 and 3, where incomplete
information is crucial, learning seems to be more important at least initially. Only
after experiencing previous plays participants seem to become aware of crucial
(strategic) considerations like over-, respectively underbidding incentives or the
chances of initial trust and the danger of later exploitation.
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Compared to this the bargaining games of section 4 and 5 require less learning
since usual norms, e.g. to aim at (efficient and) fair agreements, provide reliable
guidance already for inexperienced participants although these bargaining games
are partly more complex than those usually studied (see Roth, 1995b). In even
simpler bargaining problems learning should matter even less (see Prasnikar and
Roth, 1992, and Roth et al., 1991, for results supporting this conjecture).
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